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Restating Strict Liability
and Nuisance
Hon. Robert E. Keeton*
John Wade was a master of the craft of restating the law. The
American Law Institute ("ALI") benefitted especially from his distinctive service during development of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
It is fitting that we use, as a vehicle for honoring his service, an inquiry into a segment of tort law that was first considered in the decades just after the Institute was founded and remains, even today,
among the most difficult areas of law to restate. This segment of tort
law concerns the general theory of strict liability and the extent that
it applies to nuisance cases.
I.
To set the stage for this inquiry, let us imagine that we are
participants in a third ALI effort to restate this segment of tort law.
We are convened for a discussion, and perhaps a vote, in the year twothousand-something-or-other. I would hesitate to predict the precise
year, but hesitate not at all to predict this time will come during the
lifetime of most of the younger readers of this Article.
Before us is a draft of the proposed blackletter of Restatement
(Third) of Torts Section 822. Our hypothetical drafter appreciates the
constructive purposes that ambiguity may serve in some contexts.
But our drafter dislikes ambiguity in the statement of a legal test that
must be used daily by lawyers and judges in contexts where clarity
and precision have special value. These contexts include, for example,
use of the legal test: (1) by lawyers when preparing to advise clients
about their rights and about risks they may incur by a chosen course
of conduct; (2) by judges when deciding whether a case will be allowed
to go to a jury; and (3) by trial lawyers and trial judges when drafting
instructions to a jury on mixed law-fact questions submitted to them.
Our hypothetical drafter presents to us options aimed at encouraging us to make immediately, rather than defer to other decision
United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts.
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makers at some later time, the hard choices that someone must make
sooner or later. Making those choices wisely and immediately might
be the first step toward resolving longstanding ambiguities in the way
that many, perhaps most, writers (of judicial opinions as well as texts,
articles, and comments) have stated the legal tests for deciding
nuisance and strict liability cases.
Here is the proposed draft, commencing with the heading for
Topic 2 of Chapter 40:
HYPOTHETICAL DRAFT

TOPIC 2. PRIVATE NUISANCE: ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY
§ 822. General Rule.
An actor is subject to liability for interference with the interest of another
in private use and enjoyment of land if, but only if, the actor's conduct is a
legal cause of the interference and the interference
(a) is intentional and unreasonable,
or
(b) is unintentional and unreasonable
or
(c) whether intentional or unintentional, is unreasonable in the sense
that the interference is greater than the persons whose interests in
use and enjoyment of land are interfered with can reasonably be
required to bear without compensation. This part (c) applies even
though the conduct causing the interference is reasonable in the
sense that its social utility outweighs the harms and risks it causes.

In preparing this recommendation, our hypothetical drafter
considered options at a number of different points along the way and
prepared for our consideration another draft with sets of options.
Here is the draft with sets of options.
HYPOTaET=CAL DRAFT

§ 822 WITH SETS OF OPTIONS
§ 822. General Rule.
[Option 1] A person
[Option 2] An actor
is subject to liability for
[Option 1] invasion of
[Option 2] interference with
the interest of another in private use and enjoyment of land if, but only if, the
[person's] [actors] conduct is a legal cause of the [invasion] [interference] and
the [invasion] [interference]
(a) is intentional and unreasonable,
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(b) is
[Option 1] negligent or reckless,
[Option 2] unintentional and unreasonable,
or
[Option 1]
Cc) is actionable under rules of liability for abnormally dangerous
conduct.
[Option 2]
(c) whether intentional or unintentional, is unreasonable in the sense
that the [invasion] [interference] is greater than the persons whose
interests in use and enjoyment of land are [invaded] [interfered with]
can reasonably be required to bear without compensation. This part
(c) applies even though the conduct causing the [invasion]
[interference] is reasonable in the sense that its social utility
outweighs the harms and risks it causes.

Set forth below, for comparison, are the texts of Section 822 of
the original Restatement of Torts, and Restatement (Second) of
Torts.2
Because of the reference in Section 822 of the original
Restatement to "ultrahazardous conduct," Sections 519 and 520 of the
first Restatement, regarding "ultrahazardous activities," are set forth

below.3
1.

Restatement of Torts § 822 (1939) provides:
TOPIC 1. ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY

§ 822. GENERAL RULE.
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actors conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing
liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.
2.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979) provides:
TOPIC 2. PRIVATE NUISANCE: ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY
§ 822. General Rule.
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal
cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and
the invasion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability
for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.
3.
Restatement of Torts 9§ 519, 520 provide:
§ 519. MISCARRIAGE OF ULTRAHAzARDous AcTrIVTIEs CAREFULLY CARRIED ON.

Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is
liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be
harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from
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Because of the reference in Section 822 of the Restatement
(Second), to "abnormally dangerous conditions or activities," Sections
4
519 and 520 of Restatement (Second) are set forth below.
Before the influence of Restatement terminology, and to some
extent even afterward, a common way of describing private nuisance
was to call it an "interference with" a "protected interest [that] must
not only be substantial but it must also be unreasonable."5 It was also
common to refer to the protected interest in cases of "private

nuisance" as an interest "in the use and enjoyment of land."
Combining these phrases produces the definition of private nuisance
as a substantialand unreasonable interference with another'sinterest
in the use and enjoyment of land.
The ALI's development of Section 822 has refocused in three
ways the definition of private nuisance that serves as the standard for
determining whether a plaintiff has proved a claim under the rubric
of private nuisance. For ease of reference, I will designate these
aspects of the ALI's definition as "First," "Second," and 'Third" of five
propositions for your consideration.

that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to
prevent the harm.

§ 520. DEFINITION oF ULTRAHAA mOUS Acvrry.
An activity is ultrahazardous if it
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of
others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage.
4.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519, 520 provide:
§ 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he
has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
5.
See, for example, William. L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 580 (West, 4th ed.
1971).
6.
See, for example, id. at 591.
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First. Both the original and the Restatement (Second) formulations of Section 822 attach the adjective "unreasonable" to the
word "invasion" rather than the word "interference." Does this preference for "invasion" connote something more closely analogous to
intrusion in some physically detectable sense, and less conducive to
the allowance of damages for mental and emotional harm, than
"interference" would connote?
Second. Both the original formulation and the Restatement
(Second) formulation of Section 822 do not use the word
"unreasonable" in that part of the formulation regarding an "invasion"
that is "negligent," "reckless," or actionable under rules regarding
"ultrahazardous" or "abnormally dangerous" conduct, activity, or
condition.
Third. The original Restatement, Section 822(b), states as a
separate required element of the claim that the "invasion is
substantial." The Restatement (Second) treats substantiality not as a
separate requirement but instead as a factor bearing on whether one
or more of the remaining requirements is satisfied.
I will comment further on these three matters after introducing two more observations that I will designate "Fourth" and "Fifth"
for ease of reference.
Fourth. The Restatement (Second) formulation of Section 822
uses "abnormally dangerous" rather than "ultrahazardous" in Section
822, as well as in Sections 519 and 520.
Fifth. In place of the original Restatement's two-element
definition of "ultrahazardous activity," Restatement (Second) recites
in Section 822 a list of "factors" to be considered in deciding, in one
conclusive weighing, "whether an activity is abnormally dangerous."
Those factors include the following:
(f)extent to which its [the activity's] value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.

This new item (f), and associated comments explaining it, has
an interesting background, part of which is stated next.
II.
As Reporter, Dean Prosser prepared Tentative Draft No. 16
(1970) for consideration at the ALI meeting in May of that year. In
the discussions preceding Dean Prosser's preparation of this draft,
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Professor Fleming James had urged, with support from other advisers
(including me), that the Restatement should explain that, quite apart
from any liability for negligence or intentional tort, the law of
nuisance has traditionally imposed liability for interference with
another's interest in use and enjoyment of land if the interference is
greater than the person whose interests in use and enjoyment of land
are interfered with can reasonably be required to bear without
compensation. This traditional liablity applies even though the
conduct causing the interference is reasonable in the sense that its
social utility outweighs the harms and risks it causes. Professor
James prepared a memorandum marshaling precedent in support of
this position.7 He and others who participated in the 1970-71
discussions argued that this position was further supported by a case
decided soon after Professor James placed his memorandum in
8
circulation.
This position was accepted by a majority vote at the May 1970
meeting.9 John Wade undertook the task of revision to conform with
the Institute vote, and his revision was circulated among the advisers
in early 1971.
I responded in a letter to John Wade on March 1, 1971:
The revised draft of the Restatement sections on Nuisance, of February
23rd, [1971] is greatly improved in my view. Regretfully I have to say that I
am still less than enthusiastic about the draft. Basically my criticisms are leveled at the original Restatement. It was improved by the revisions Bill
[Prosser] drafted, and has been further improved by your revisions, but I hope
10
you will be persuaded to make still more changes ....

A central point I was urging then, and still urge today, is that
the way "unreasonable" is used in Section 822 of the original
Restatement is curious and confusing at the least. If "unreasonable"
is interpreted in one of its traditional ways, its use is not, in my view,
well supported by precedent or on policy grounds.
Consider, for example, Section 822, subparagraph (a). It says
an intentional invasion must be unreasonable to be actionable, but

7.

Reproduced as Appendix A of Restatement (Second) of Torts: Tentative Draft No. 16

(1970).

8. Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647, 652 (1969)
(refusing to balance the utility of the offending conduct against the gravity of the injury inflicted
in a nuisance action for damages).
9.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts: Tentative Draft No. 17, comment j (1971), and
Dean Wade's explanatory comments on "The James-Keeton Proposals," id. at 31-32.
10. Letter from Robert Keeton to John Wade (March 1, 1971) (copy on file with the
Author).
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the requirement of unreasonableness is omitted from subparagraph
(b). In this respect, the Restatement (Second) formulation carries
forward the pattern of the original Restatement. This theme is also
carried forward in revisions of Sections 826 and 827.
We may reasonably infer that drafters of the original
Restatement thought they did not need to speak of unreasonableness
in relation to unintended invasions because the concept of unreasonableness was inherent in the terms "negligent" and "reckless" and was
not a requirement, as they saw it, if the invasion was otherwise
"actionable under the rules governing liability for... ultrahazardous
conduct."
One problem about this way of thinking is the failure to take
account of the material difference between using the adjective
"unreasonable" to modify "conduct" and using it to modify
"interference with" or "invasion of" another's interests. Using the
standard of unreasonablenessof conduct in relation to a claim of negligence or recklessness is materially different from using the standard
of unreasonableness of the invasion (or interference) in relation to a
claim of nuisance. The drafters of the original Restatement seemed
aware of this difference at some points in their comments but for
some reason did not adhere to the distinction in drafting the blackletter and in many other parts of the comments.
I believe it to be the case that, with few exceptions apart from
those opinions of the last fifty years that have cited and relied upon
the Restatement, judicial opinions in nuisance cases have stated or
assumed that no interference with use and enjoyment of land, intentional or unintentional, is actionable unless it is a "substantial" and
"unreasonable" interference (or invasion). It is also clear, however,
that an interference (or invasion) can be "unreasonable' in this nuisance sense even though social utility outweighs risk with the consequence that the conduct producing the interference is not
"unreasonable" in the negligence sense.
Warren Seavey used to say, in defense of the first Restatement
(during the development of which he was one of the advisers to the
reporters), that you cannot have a nuisance founded on prudent, ultrahazardous conduct because by definition that conduct is not unreasonable. He therefore concluded that the Restatement departed from
the precedents when it declared there could be a nuisance founded on
prudent, ultrahazardous conduct.
It seems to me that Warren Seavey was right insofar as he was
asserting that the precedents required unreasonableness to support
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liability for private nuisance. But I nevertheless believe that the
Restatement concept of a nuisance founded on ultrahazardous conduct is consistent with the precedents because the nuisance concept of
unreasonableness is different from the negligence concept of unreasonableness, and unreasonable interference can be found to exist even
though no unreasonable conduct could be proved because the conduct
was prudent in the negligence sense. Indeed, if the original
Restatement differed from precedents at this point, more likely it was
in confining strict liability under nuisance theory to cases of ultrahazardous activity than in allowing to this modest extent a bit of strict
liability under the rubric of nuisance.
Both the original and the Restatement (Second) versions of
Sections 822, 826, and 827 may be read as implying that
"unreasonableness" is not part of the test for liability applied by
judges (or juries, if judges leave it to juries) to determine whether an
unintended invasion (or interference) is a nuisance. I believe this
implicit proposition is not supported by precedent, principle, or policy.
Since the Restatement (Second) version of Section 822 used
"unintentional" and "unreasonable" as modifiers of "the invasion," one
way (perhaps the least disruptive way) of correcting the flawed
implication would have been to revise Section 822 subparagraph (b) to
read as follows:
(b) Unintentional and unreasonable or otherwise actionable under the
principles controlling liability for negligent, reckless or abnormally dangerous
conduct.

In any event, whatever change a drafter might make in Section
822 in this respect should, of course, be carried into the text and
comments in Sections 826 and 827, so as to indicate that
"unreasonableness" applies to nuisance by unintended invasion (or
interference) as well as nuisance by intended invasion (or
interference).
Even better, perhaps, would have been a change of subparagraph (b) to read as follows:
(b) Unintentional and unreasonable.

To be a private nuisance, an interference (whether intentional
or unintentional) must be unreasonable.
But standards of
"unreasonableness" bearing on negligence, recklessness and
abnormally dangerous conduct (or activity) .applied in determining
liability for harm to person or property are different from the stan-
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dard of unreasonableness used in the law of nuisance, and it is
confusing to refer to those standards even as analogies, worse still as
if they were expressions of the same concept.
For example, a driver who speeds through a thirty miles per
hour zone in a city is negligent because of the risk of injury to persons
and property. That negligent conduct also may cause interference
with use and enjoyment of properties in the area because the noise of
the racing motor and squealing tires awakens sleepers. Some of those
interferences are intentional because of the driver's knowledge, even
while acting, that the interferences were occurring. But it might well
be that the noise extended farther than the driver realized. Thus the
driver's negligent conduct would have caused some unintended interferences. Are those interferences automatically classified as nuisances? I would think not. But Section 822 seems to say yes, unless
one infers that the conduct must be negligent in relation to the nuisance type of interest and that it is not enough that the conduct is
"otherwise actionable" because somebody was hurt.
It would have been better and more consistent with precedents
to treat carelessness in causing unintended interference with use and
enjoyment of land as just one of the factors weighed in determining
whether the interference was unreasonable. But this way of thinking
might reasonably be understood to be distinctly different from that
implicit in both the original and the Restatement (Second) versions of
Section 822.
More modest changes might reasonably be considered also in
our hypothetical two-thousand-something discussion. The example of
the negligent driver, discussed above, suggests that one who is guilty
of actionable negligence causing physical harm may yet not be liable
for an interference with use and enjoyment of land resulting from the
same conduct.
A second example shows that one may be liable for an unintended interference that does not come within any of the three concepts of negligence, recklessness, and abnormally dangerous conduct.
This second example is a hypothetical case, rather like Jost."
Suppose an accidental discharge of a fine mist of pollutants, when a
new plant that was reasonably supposed to be pollution-proof goes
into operation. Of course the continued operation of the plant, after
11. See note 8. In Jost, plaintiffs, alleging that the discharge of sulfur fumes from
defendant's generating plant damaged their crops and soil, sought damages for injury to crops
and loss of market value of their farm. 172 N.W.2d at 648-49.
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the ineffectiveness of anti-pollutant devices is known, involves intended invasions. But the invasions occurring before the results
became known may have produced substantial damage, and the damage may have occurred without negligence, recklessness, or abnormally dangerous conduct.
I believe (as I understand Professor James's memorandum to
have argued) precedents support liability in such a case. Yet the
blackletter of Section 822, even as revised, seems to me to say there
would be no liability unless the judge or jury happened to come out
this way in a discretionary application of the multi-factor evaluation-including the new (f) factor-taking account of this kind of
circumstance as just one factor among others.
The example just given is also relevant, of course, to the central point of Fleming James's memorandum reproduced in Tentative
Draft No. 16 and to the vote of the 1970 Annual Meeting.
I had a concern then, and still have it now, that some readers
will read the blackletter as finally endorsed as easing back from the
scope of strict liability approved in the 1970 vote. Unlike decisions of
courts, Institute votes can be cast without explanation. Perhaps
before the outcome of the 1970 vote was incorporated into a
blackletter text acceptable to the membership at final approval, it had
been toned down a bit from the phrasing of the 1970 motion because
of the realization that when the majority voted for the motion, there
was vigorous dissent.
III.
As the Institute's consideration of strict liability and nuisance
progressed through the decades from the 1930s through the 1970s,
the formulations of the legal tests for determining the scope of strict
liability, both in general and under the rubric of nuisance in particular, pushed farther toward the use of multi-factor evaluative standards (and correspondingly less use of bright-line rules) than did
either the corresponding sections of the first Restatement or the
formulations appearing in other chapters of the Restatement
(Second).
Can we identify the reasons?
Is the best explanation to be found in the inherent nature of
the different subject matter of different chapters of the Restatement?
In the common law the ALI was restating? Were developments intervening between completion of the initial Restatement and final ap-
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proval of the Restatement (Second) more significant in these areas
than in others?
Or is a better explanation found in the combination of a changing point of balance among contrasting perspectives of Institute members and the influence of John Wade's instincts and leadership in
searching for a formulation that represented the closest thing to consensus that could be produced?
John Wade was ever searching more deeply and persistently
for common ground. Did this instinct and his leadership bring the
Institute to elect multi-factor evaluative standards as better reflecting
the maturing sense of professionals of that time? Was it the
Institute's sense that developments of the twentieth century pointed
to a preference for multi-factor evaluative standards over bright-line
rules?
An observer might be more likely to sense a trend of this kind
in the areas of strict liability and nuisance than in other areas of tort
law, or law generally. The clashing interests and policy perceptions in
these areas were perhaps more likely to lead one to shy away from too
many hard edges and, even at the sacrifice to some degree of efficiency and predictability, to seek the ends of justice by allowing judicial decision makers, and in some instances juries as well, the greater
degree of discretion that is inherent in using evaluative standards to
determine liability.
IV.
The principal section on nuisance, as it emerged from all the
consultation and debate of the 1970s, reflects a judgment of the
Institute consistent with John Wade's recommendation for a multifactor evaluative standard. Perhaps it is a correct observation also
that judicial decisions of the latter half of the twentieth century have
moved farther than had decisions of earlier vintage toward reliance on
evaluative standards in areas where policy arguments founded on
highly-valued interests can be invoked by each set of opposing advocates.
In the earlier stages of this clash over the nature of the legal
test for liability, evaluative standards tended usually to have the
effect of supporting somewhat broader liability than did bright-line
rules. At that time, this influence on outcomes could be expected from
conferring more discretion upon both trial judges and juries. It is less
clear that conferring greater discretion tends today to have the effect
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of expanding tort liability. Neither juries nor trial judges are as predictably inclined to favor liability. One consequence is that the perspective of partisans on the use of evaluative standards in legal doctrine is less predictable today.
In addition to partisan interests at stake in the choice between
hard-edged rules and multi-factor evaluative standards is a public
interest. Underlying the common law system, in which precedent is
binding on decision makers (except in rare and generally defined circumstances), is the premise that justice should be administered in an
evenhanded way, to produce like outcomes in like cases. The dilemma
that constantly faces lawmakers in choosing the form of legal tests for
liability is where to strike the balance among competing interests and
policy arguments. For a balance must be struck between, on the one
hand, allowing decision makers in individual cases discretion to take
into account every circumstance that appeals to one's sense of justice,
and, on the other hand, prescribing bright-line rules that assure
evenhanded and predictable decision making.
One speculation suggested by these observations is that the
wisest choice about how and where to strike the balance on this issue
of lawmaking style is not necessarily the same for all generations in
the ongoing development of law. Perhaps the sense of the American
Law Institute, in that period of accelerated change toward expanded
tort liability that was ongoing from the late 1950s into the 1970s, was
that the Institute, in relying to somewhat greater extent on multifactor evaluative tests in its Restatement of the law of torts, was
faithful to the law as it was then developing.
V.
I return, finally, to the theme with which I began.
John Wade was instinctively the scholar and teacher. He was
gracious, always ready to listen and learn, to probe more deeply both
the subject matter under inquiry and the perspectives of others who
appeared to differ with his own view of that matter, and to explain
what he had come to understand. In personal qualities as well as
scholarly instinct, he was an energetic but always gentle and constructive participant in probing for deeper understanding.
My most sustained contacts with John Wade occurred in that
extraordinary assortment of torts enthusiasts (lawyers, judges, and
professors) who were the advisers to the reporter for the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Dean Prosser's skill as a sprightly writer and his
passion for comprehensive research enabled him, as reporter, to place
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before us, as a point of beginning for every successive chapter of our
work, a draft that made significant improvements on the first
Restatement. These drafts were orderly and readable distillations of
the generalizations and the more precise rules he had derived from
the common law materials on tort law-already massive in the decades when this group was doing its work. The advisers were meeting
with the reporter at least twice a year. Of course, there were
strongly-held differences among us.
John Wade, distinctively, was the most persistent among the
group in searching for common ground that would enable us to reach
recommendations acceptable not only to Bill Prosser as reporter but
also, in due course, to the council and the Institute.
At a stage when pressures for prompt completion were building, Bill Prosser's health led him to consider resignation. It was the
consensus of the advisers (apart from John Wade, though we freely
expressed our views in his presence) that John Wade should lead our
efforts to assure Bill Prosser our full support and assistance and try
to persuade him to continue as reporter, or at least, if the director and
council approved, as chief reporter with assistance. When those efforts failed, John Wade was the consensus choice (not only among
advisers but more significantly among officers of the Institute as well)
for reporter to complete the project. Thus it was that John Wade
became reporter for the chapters on strict liability and nuisance,
among others then unfinished.
The assignment was an especially difficult one. The reasons
were rooted in the subject matter and in problems left unresolved in
the first Restatement of Torts. Both among advisers and among
Institute membership generally, differences over the unresolved
issues were significant and vigorously voiced.
Both professionally and personally, all of us who served with
John Wade in the many professional activities to which he devoted his
energies and talents have greatly benefitted and have been deeply
moved by knowing him and his work. As one of that large group, I
will continue to remember fondly the personal associations.
I salute John Wade's distinctive contributions to the legal
profession.
We miss him, personally, and those of us who participate in
the two-thousand-something-or-other Institute debates among torts
enthusiasts will miss his professional presence.

